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Hope for the Hopi in a Post-Hobby Lobby 
World: The Supreme Court’s Recent 
Interpretation of RFRA and  
Strengthening Native Americans’  
Religious-Based Land Rights Claims  
SARA MOVAHED†  
 
Among the diverse array of Native American traditions, a unify-
ing thread is the recognition that humans and our natural world are 
interdependent.1 This recognition extends beyond a mere superficial 
connection. It embodies a rich, deeply held belief that the physical and 
spiritual realms can unite in “certain natural phenomena or locations.”2 
The fact that physical locations are of “vital significance” to Native 
Americans has often evaded the American legal system,3 which oper-
ates on an understanding that “land, Mother Earth, can be divided into 
 
© 2016 Sara Movahed. 
†Senior Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2015–2016; J.D. Univer-
sity of Maryland Francis Carey School of Law, May 2016.  
 1.  Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Voices in Historic Preservation: Sacred Landscapes, Cross-
Cultural Bridges, and Common Ground, 21 VT. L. REV. 145, 160 (1996) (quoting Christopher 
Vecsey, Envision Ourselves Darkly, Imagine Ourselves Richly, in The American Indian And 
The Problem Of History 120, 125 (Calvin Martin ed., 1987)) (“One of the most significant 
ways in which Indian tribal cultures are different from much of the larger American society 
can be seen in the ways that tribal cultures understand their relationships with the natural 
world . . . Indian stories espouse a ‘triplefold declaration of dependence on the surrounding 
world: of the individual on the community, of the community on nature, and of nature on the 
ultimately powerful world of spirit.’”). 
 2.  Sarah B. Gordon, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of Pub-
lic Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447, 1449 (1985). 
 3.  Id. at 1451 (“The American legal system, however, has generally failed to recognize 
that physical locations within its own jurisdiction may be of vital significance to site-specific 
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parcels that can be owned by individual human beings.”4 This integral 
tension between these sovereign entities5 was at times settled by sword, 
but more often by treaty.6 Through these treaties “a tribe conveyed land 
to the United States in exchange for promises by the federal govern-
ment to recognize and protect the tribe’s right to continue to live as a 
separate people and to exercise self-government within the territory 
that it reserved to itself.”7 Only against this historical backdrop can the 
implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc. on Native American religious freedom claims be 
fully appreciated.8 
In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court found the contraceptive 
health-insurance mandate of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 
(“ACA”)9 violated several closely held corporations’ religious exercise 
privileges under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
(“RFRA”).10 While the religious right and anti-abortion groups consid-
ered this a victory, and advocates for reproductive freedom and broad 
health care coverage deemed it a major set-back, Native American ad-
vocates were left uncertain of Hobby Lobby’s implications on their free 
exercise of religion claims.11 Native Americans, in the context of 
RFRA and other federal laws, have long been advocating for land-use 
 
religions. It does not acknowledge that a sense of spiritual immediacy and of awe for places 
that have witnessed momentous spiritual events, similar to that felt by many Jews and Chris-
tians only in the ‘Holy Land,’ is felt by Native Americans for sites that may seem unremarka-
ble or of mere natural beauty to non-Indian observers.”). 
 4.  Suagee, supra note 1, at 154. 
 5.  Russel Lawrence Barsh, Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1982 
Edition, 57 WASH. L. REV. 799, 800 (1982) (“Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian 
law . . . is the principle that those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, 
in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers 
of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.”(quoting FELIX S. COHEN, 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1941))). 
 6.  Suagee, supra note 1, at 151–52.  
 7.  Id.  
 8.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 9.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 119(2010).  
 10.  Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et 
seq. (1993) [hereinafter RFRA]. 
 11.  Winter King, Could the Hobby Lobby Ruling Have Saved the San Francisco Peaks, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (July 15, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianet-
work.com/2014/07/15/could-hobby-lobby-ruling-have-saved-san-francisco-peaks; see also 
Rob Capriccioso, Supreme Court Used Indian Law to Prevent Birth Control for Women, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (July 2, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianet-
work.com/2014/07/02/supreme-court-used-indian-law-prevent-birth-control-women-
155618?page=0%2C1. 
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rights,12 protections of their indigenous lands, and the use of animal 
effects in traditional ceremonies.13  
This piece responds to a case study by Professor Justin B. Rich-
land.  In the context of two recent conflicts, Richland illustrates the 
tension between Hopi peoples’ efforts to fulfill their religious obliga-
tions on the one hand, and U.S. federal laws and policies on the other,.14 
What will the Supreme Court’s upholding of Hobby Lobby’s religious 
freedom mean for the ongoing litigation discussed in Richland’s case 
study, and might prior litigation have been decided differently? Will 
Native Americans’ suits challenging the legality of the federal govern-
ment’s infringements on their sacred grounds be more likely to succeed 
in a post-Hobby Lobby world, or does the Court’s decision in Hobby 
Lobby cover a realm beyond (or beneath) indigenous peoples’ rights? 
This piece argues Hobby Lobby has substantially altered the Court’s 
understanding of RFRA claims, a recognition that has already resulted 
in more successful religious freedom suits by Native Americans.  
I.  HOBBY LOBBY HAS ENTIRELY RESTRUCTURED THE FREE EXERCISE 
FRAMEWORK 
In Hobby Lobby, the Court held that federal regulations requiring 
“closely held” corporations to provide health insurance for certain con-
traceptives violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
(“RFRA”),15 if providing such contraceptives contradict the “sincerely 
held” religious beliefs of the corporation.16   
Hobby Lobby is the most recent step in a long conversation on 
religious freedom between the judicial, legislative, and executive 
branches. In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment Div., Dep’t 
of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith.17  In Employment Division, the 
Court denied the First Amendment claims of two Native American 
men who were fired from their jobs and denied unemployment com-
pensation because they admitted using peyote for religious purposes at 
 
 12.  See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 13.  Kevin J. Worthen, Eagle Feathers and Equality: Lessons on Religious Exceptions 
from the Native American Experience, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 989 (2005) (describing the various 
challenges to federal eagle protection acts brought by Native Americans, who use bald and 
golden eagle feathers for ceremonial purposes).  
 14.  See J.B. Richland, Paths in the Wilderness?: The Politics and Practices of Hopi Re-
ligious Freedom in Hopitutskwa, 31 MD. J. INT’ L. 217 (2017). 
 15.  Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et 
seq. (1993). 
 16.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
 17.  494 U.S. 872 (1990) (superseded by statute). 
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a ceremony of the Native American Church.18 In his opinion for the 
Court, Justice Scalia wrote that the strict scrutiny test need not be ap-
plied to all cases in which the free exercise of religion is implicated, as 
long as the law curtailing religious freedom is of general applicabil-
ity.19 The Court found strict scrutiny inapposite, despite the longstand-
ing tradition of applying this heightened scrutiny standard to funda-
mental interests, and hesitated to deem infringements on the exercise 
of religion presumptively invalid.20  
Three years later, RFRA was enacted as a response to the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Employment Division,21 as a means of 
providing “very broad protection for religious liberty”22 and overruling 
the reduced protections for religious freedom caused by Employment 
Division.23 RFRA prohibits the federal government from imposing a 
“substantial[] burden” on an individual’s exercise of religion, “even if 
the burden results from a rule of general applicability,”24 unless the 
government is able to demonstrate the burden furthers a “compelling 
governmental interest” and the burden is the “least restrictive means” 
of furthering that interest.25  
In 1997, five years after Congress enacted RFRA, the Court in 
City of Boerne v. Flores26 found RFRA unconstitutional with respect 
to states (but still intact against the federal government) because it was 
an overreach of Congress’ authority to enforce the First Amendment 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.27 In response, Congress enacted 
 
 18.  Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 874. 
 19.  See generally id. 
 20.  Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 889. 
 21.  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 22.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767 (2014). 
 23.  See e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859–60 (2015); see also Hobby Lobby, 134 
S. Ct. at 2760.  
 24.  The specification that the standard applies even to rules of “general applicability” is 
a response to the Court’s decision in Employment Division exempting rules of general applica-
bility from strict scrutiny. See Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 879. 
 25.  RFRA, supra note 10. 
 26.  521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 27.  RFRA, was applied against the states under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
interpreting the court’s First Amendment doctrine. Because it was enacted at a time when the 
Court’s limited Employment Division interpretation of free exercise was operational, RFRA’s 
“stringent test” was deemed in excess of the Employment Division understanding of the First 
Amendment.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761–62; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 534–35 (1997) (“Simply put, RFRA is not designed to identify and counteract state 
laws likely to be unconstitutional because of their treatment of religion. In most cases, the state 
laws to which RFRA applies are not ones which will have been motivated by religious bigotry. 
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the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
(“RLUIPA”),28 not relying on its powers under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, instead relying on its Commerce and Spending Clause powers.29 
RLUIPA became the state equivalent of RFRA, but applied to a nar-
rower set of government actions: state and local regulations of inmates 
and land use.30 Most importantly, RLUIPA amended RFRA, omitting 
its reference to the First Amendment, in effect transforming RFRA into 
a pure statutory protection, arguably in excess of the Constitutional 
floor set by the First Amendment.31 
The Petitioner corporations in Hobby Lobby argued that their stat-
utory right to exercise their religion freely, as enshrined under RFRA, 
was substantially burdened by the ACA mandate to provide health-
insurance coverage for certain contraceptives.32 In determining 
whether closely held corporations were required to comply with the 
ACA’s contraceptive insurance requirement, Hobby Lobby affirmed 
RFRA’s twin safeguards. Namely,if a governmental regulation sub-
stantially burdens an individual’s exercise of religion, the individual 
(or closely held corporation) is exempted from compliance unless the 
regulation: “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental inter-
est; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.”33  
To discern how the Court’s Hobby Lobby decision might affect 
suits stemming from the tension between Native Americans’ religious 
freedom and federal regulations, the three components of the RFRA 
protection—when a government (A) substantially burdens the exercise 
of religion, it must have a (B) compelling interest; and (C) act in the 
least restrictive means possible—are illustrated through the facts of the 
Hobby Lobby case itself.34 
The Hobby Lobby Court had “little trouble” deciding that the con-
traceptive mandate imposed on the corporations substantially burdens 
 
If a state law disproportionately burdened a particular class of religious observers, this circum-
stance might be evidence of an impermissible legislative motive.”). 
 28.  114 Stat. 803; 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. 
 29.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761–62 (2014). 
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 2759. 
 33.  Id. at 2759–61. 
 34.  See infra I.A. (substantial burden); infra I.B. (compelling governmental interest); and 
infra I.C. (least restrictive means).  
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the corporations’ right to freely exercise their religion.35 If the corpo-
rations disregarded the regulation and instead provided health insur-
ance plans that did not cover the contested contraceptive, they would 
be “taxed $100 per day for each affected individual,” which could 
amount to daily costs of $1.3 million, $90,000, and $40,000 for each 
of the three Petitioner companies, figures the Court deemed “surely 
substantial.”36 While the substantiality of $1.3 million in daily taxes is 
difficult to deny, establishing that this tax is a substantial burden on 
the exercise of religion is more difficult. In addressing this aspect of 
the substantial burden test, the Court cited the corporations’ “sincere 
religious belief that life begins at conception,” which would be contra-
vened if they were to provide health insurance plans that cover meth-
ods of birth control that could “result in the destruction of an em-
bryo.”37 In contrast, the government reasoned that the connection 
between (i) the requirement to provide health insurance that would 
cover the contraceptives at issue, and (ii) the mere possibility that em-
ployees may choose to take advantage of such contraceptives that 
might ultimately result in the destruction of an embryo, is attenuated.38 
The majority responded that “the question that RFRA presents [is] 
(whether the HHS mandate imposes a substantial burden on the ability 
of the objecting parties to conduct business in accordance with their 
religious beliefs),” not “a very different question that the federal courts 
have no business addressing (whether the religious belief asserted in a 
RFRA case is reasonable).”39 
The compelling interest test requires a court to find that the gov-
ernmental interest would actually be satisfied if the law in question 
were applied to the complaining party.40 The governmental interest ar-
ticulated by the Court is the interest in “guaranteeing cost-free access 
to the four challenged contraceptive methods.”41 Despite finding this 
interest sufficiently compelling, the Court cautioned that the interests 
of “public health” and “gender equality,” first expressed by the gov-
 
 35.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014). 
 36.  Id. at 2775–76. 
 37.  Id. at 2775. 
 38.  Id. at 2778. 
 39.  Id.  
 40. . Id. at 2779 (citing Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 
U.S. 418, 419–20 (2006)).  
 41.  Id. at 2780. 
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ernment, were too broad for the “more focused” inquiry RFRA re-
quires.42   
The Court deemed the least restrictive means test “exceptionally 
demanding;” a hurdle the government bears the burden of jumping.43 
The Court contemplated that the government, as a less restrictive 
means of bringing about its compelling interest—guaranteeing cost-
free access to the challenged contraceptives—could assume the burden 
of paying for the contraceptives for the women who are not able to 
obtain them under their insurance policies.44 Finding this to be a solu-
tion that would obviously impose a lesser restriction on the corpora-
tions’ ability to freely exercise their religion, the Court invalidated the 
ACA contraceptives mandate as applied against the closely held cor-
porations in question.45   
II.  RFRA-BASED RELIGIOUS    EXERCISE CLAIMS BY NATIVE 
AMERICANS POST-HOBBY LOBBY 
Since Hobby Lobby was decided on June 30, 2014, several claims 
have been brought by Native Americans challenging governmental re-
strictions on their religious freedom. The outcomes have been more 
favorable for the petitioning Native Americans, a trend likely to con-
tinue.  
A  McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar 
Just two months after the Hobby Lobby decision was released, the 
Fifth Circuit decided McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar.46 
McAllen addressed the availability of RFRA as a defense to a violation 
of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) and the Bald and Golden 
Eagle Protection Act (“Eagle Protection Act”) for Native Americans 
of non-federally recognized tribes.47 In McAllen, Appellants were ap-
prehended by a Fish and Wildlife Services agent at a Native American 
religious ceremony for selling dreamcatchers that contained bird feath-
ers.48 Only one of the Appellants, Soto, is a Native American.49 He is a 
 
 42.  Id. at 2779. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45. Id. at 2784–85. 
 46.  McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 468. 
 49.  Id. 
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member of the Lipan Apache Tribe, which is not federally recog-
nized.50 Soto filed a petition for the return of his feathers, which was 
denied because he was not a member of a federally recognized tribe, a 
necessary condition to obtaining a permit for possession of eagle feath-
ers under the Eagle Protection Act.51 The court ultimately denied the 
government’s summary judgment motion, recognizing that the govern-
ment failed to meet its high burden under RFRA, particularly in light 
of the Hobby Lobby decision, but remanded for further fact-finding.52  
The McAllen court analyzed the three prongs of the RFRA analy-
sis—did the prohibition on using eagle feathers (1) substantially bur-
den the Appellants’ ability to exercise their religion, was the restriction 
(2) imposed pursuant to a compelling government interest, and (3) the 
least restrictive means of achieving that interest—through a post-
Hobby Lobby lens.53   
The government did not contest the fact that the Eagle Protection 
Act substantially burdened Soto’s free exercise of his religious beliefs 
given that Soto was “involved in a ministry that uses eagle feathers in 
its worship practice.”54 Despite this not being a contested question, the 
court recognized that the eagle feather is sacred to many Native Amer-
icans.55   
The court then applied the second prong, clarifying that a com-
pelling governmental interest must be of the “highest order” and can-
not be mere “general statements of interest.”56 The court considered the 
two interests alleged by the government in turn: “(1) protecting eagles 
and (2) fulfilling the government’s ‘unique responsibility’ to federally 
recognized tribes.”57 The court deemed the interest in protecting bald 
eagles compelling, looking to Ninth and Tenth Circuit precedent as 
 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id. at 469. 
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id. at 471. 
 54.  Id. at 472. 
 55.  Id. And, therefore, the court held “any scheme that limits the access that Soto, as a 
sincere adherent to an American Indian religion, has to possession of eagle feathers has a sub-
stantial effect on the exercise of his religious beliefs.” Id.  This broadened understanding of an 
acceptable religious belief is likely informed by the recognition in Hobby Lobby that a court 
is not to pass judgment on the reasonableness of the belief in question, only on the sincerity 
of the believer.  
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 473. 
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support for this finding.58 The second interest, that of fulfilling the gov-
ernment’s responsibility to federally recognized tribes, was one the 
court struggled to accept.59 The interest was implicated on a theory that, 
because Soto is a member of a non-federally recognized tribe, the gov-
ernment would somehow be shirking its responsibilities to federally 
recognized tribes if it were to grant Soto permission to use eagle feath-
ers in his religious practice.60 The court found the government  failed 
to meet its burden of establishing this as a compelling interest, but re-
manded in part on this issue.61  
With respect to the third RFRA prong, the McAllen court looked 
to Hobby Lobby for its application of the least restrictive means test.62 
The McAllen court considered Hobby Lobby a “reaffirm[ation] that the 
burden on the government in demonstrating the least restrictive means 
test is a heavy burden.”63 The government argued that “excluding sin-
cere adherents of American Indian religions such as Soto who are not 
members of federally recognized tribes” from obtaining permits “ad-
vances the government’s interest in preserving the eagle population.”64 
It claimed: “(1) allowing broader possession would undermine law en-
forcement’s efforts to combat the illegal trade of eagle feathers and 
parts; and (2) broader permitting would create law enforcement prob-
lems because law enforcement does not have a means of verifying an 
individual’s American Indian heritage.”65 The court, however, found 
the government had not met its burden of establishing that excluding 
members of non-federally recognized tribes from obtaining permits is 
the least restrictive means.66 It then instructed the district court to “con-
sider the authorities cited in light of the Supreme Court’s recent hold-
ing in Hobby Lobby and its exacting standard.”67  
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in McAllen is a significant step to-
ward protecting religious freedom of Native Americans, particularly 
because it recognized the sincerity of Soto’s beliefs despite the fact 
that he did not belong to a federally recognized tribe. Presumably, if 
the court is willing to extend RFRA protection to a Native American 
 
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Id. at 474. 
 60.  Id. at 474. 
 61.  Id. at 475. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 476. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 477–78. 
 67.  Id. at 478 (emphasis added).  
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who does not belong to a federally recognized tribe, it would have even 
less trouble doing the same in cases involving members of federally 
recognized tribes.68  
B.  Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe  
In N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe,69 the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Wyoming determined that the government’s restriction on the 
Northern Arapaho Tribe’s use of bald eagles in a religious Sun Dance 
ceremony did not survive the strict reading of RFRA articulated in 
Hobby Lobby.70 It determined it would be “clearly erroneous and result 
in manifest injustice if this Court ignored the Supreme Court’s hold-
ings in Hobby Lobby,” and felt it had to depart from an earlier decision 
upholding the ban.71 “[I]n light of Hobby Lobby,” the court stated, “the 
decision to limit Plaintiffs’ permit to areas outside of the Wind River 
Reservation is not justified by a compelling interest.”72  The N. Arap-
aho Tribe court also made mention of the Fifth Circuit’s decision to 
depart from prior precedent in McAllen.73 The court considered it “sig-
nificant[]” that “the Fifth Circuit noted that Hobby Lobby may well 
change the Tenth Circuit’s [pre-Hobby Lobby] compelling interest 
analysis.”74 This interpretation indicates an uncertainty in both the 
lower and appellate courts on the scope of Hobby Lobby, but a desire 
to err on the side of applying heightened scrutiny test to uphold Native 
Americans’ exercise of religious freedom claims. 
C.  Applying Hobby Lobby to Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest 
Services 
Quite possibly, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Navajo Nation v. 
U.S. Forest Services would have come out differently if it were decided 
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby.75 In that case, 
Hopi, along with several other tribes, sued the federal government for 
permitting a private ski resort to spray artificial snow (created from 
treated wastewater) on Nuvatukya’ovi or Mt. Humphreys, a sacred 
 
 68.  Particularly because the court recognizes that “Congress has the ability to protect the 
country’s relationship with federally recognized tribes,” and may even have a responsibility 
to do so. Id. at 473. 
 69.  92 F. Supp. 3d 1160 (D. Wyo. 2015).  
 70.  See N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d at 1187. 
 71.  Id. at 1181. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 1187. 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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mountain.76 The Ninth Circuit held that the Hopi’s RFRA rights were 
not violated because the “desecration” of the indigenous groups’ holy 
mountain did not impose a “substantial burden” on their exercise of 
religion.77   
In analysis, the court limited the substantial burden inquiry under 
RFRA to what it had been in the Supreme Court’s pre-Smith Free Ex-
ercise Clause precedent. The court opined “[b]ecause Congress ex-
pressly restored pre-Smith cases in RFRA, we cannot conclude 
RFRA’s ‘substantial burden’ standard expands beyond the pre-Smith 
cases to cover government actions never recognized by the Supreme 
Court to constitute a substantial burden on religious exercise.”78 While 
this may have been the prevailing understanding of RFRA’s scope at 
the time Navajo Nation was decided, it certainly has not survived post-
Hobby Lobby. In fact, the Court in Hobby Lobby expressly affirmed 
that “RFRA, by imposing a least-restrictive-means test, went beyond 
what was required by our pre-Smith decisions.”79 Thus, the Navajo Na-
tion court’s assertion that “the dissent cannot point to a single Supreme 
Court case where the Court found a substantial burden on the free ex-
ercise of religion outside the Sherbert/Yoder framework” is now incor-
rect.80  
Because the Hobby Lobby Court understands RFRA as an exten-
sion of religious freedom beyond that under the pre-Smith line of cases, 
the substantial burden test applied in Navajo Nation is no longer accu-
rate.81 Under the outdated pre-Smith standard, the Navajo Nation court 
assessed the severity of the burden of having reclaimed wastewater 
sprayed onto the holy mountain.82 It determined the “only effect” to be 
on the Native Americans’ “subjective, emotional religious experi-
ence.”83 Despite recognizing that the spraying “will spiritually dese-
crate a sacred mountain and will decrease the spiritual fulfillment they 
get from practicing their religion on the mountain,” the court deemed 
the “diminishment of spiritual fulfillment” an insubstantial burden on 
the free exercise of religion.84 
Under Hobby Lobby, such disregard for the emotional impact of 
 
 76.  Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1062–63.  
 77.  Id. at 1063–64.  
 78.  Id. at 1075. 
 79.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 n.18 (2014). 
 80.  Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 81.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 n.18 (2014). 
 82.  Id. at 1070. 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1070. 
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an action is improper.85 The Hobby Lobby Court acknowledged that it 
is not the role of the court to assess “whether the religious belief as-
serted in a RFRA case is reasonable,” which is a question “the federal 
courts have no business addressing.”86 Instead, the court may only de-
termine whether the governmental imposition in question places a 
“substantial burden on the ability of the objecting parties to [act] in 
accordance with their religious beliefs.”87 The Hobby Lobby Court re-
jected the government’s position that the effect of the government ac-
tion on the parties’ ability to freely exercise their religion was “simply 
too attenuated.”88 There the action in question would merely require 
the corporations to fund health-insurance plans for four contraceptives 
that, if used, might operate after the fertilization of an egg, because the 
corporations believe the destruction of an embryo is “morally 
wrong.”89 Certainly, in comparison with the attenuated substantial bur-
den accepted in Hobby Lobby, the burden on the Hopi, who “collect 
plants, water, and other materials from the Peaks for medicinal bundles 
and tribal healing ceremonies,” is substantial.90 In dissent, Judge 
Fletcher caustically remarks, “The majority holds that spraying 1.5 
million gallons per day of treated sewage effluent on the most sacred 
mountain of southwestern Indian tribes does not ‘substantially burden’ 
their ‘exercise of religion’ in violation of RFRA.”91 Perhaps his con-
cern that “the majority has effectively read American Indians out of 
RFRA” will be assuaged by the revised understanding of RFRA in a 
post-Hobby Lobby world.92 
III.  CONCLUSION 
While advocates have rightfully criticized the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hobby Lobby for many reasons, one beacon of light in its 
questionable impact is its application to Native American religious 
freedom claims. The Court articulated an understanding of RFRA that 
recognizes the subjectivity and uniqueness of religious beliefs. This 
understanding is crucial to Native American religious freedom claims, 
 
 85.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770 (“[T]he exercise of religion involves not only belief 
and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts that are engaged in 
for religious reasons.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86.  Id. at 2778 (emphasis added). 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Id. at 2777. 
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1064. 
 91.  Id. at 1113–14 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
 92.  Id. 
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which often consider spiritual fulfillment a fundamental component of 
the free exercise of religion. Moving forward, will Hobby Lobby con-
tinue to carry as much weight when applied to these claims? Most 
likely, as already evinced by several successful post-Hobby Lobby Na-
tive American RFRA claims, courts will recognize its relevance in this 
context and protect the religious freedom of Native Americans. If not, 
it would be time to question a precedent that would recognize broad-
sweeping religious freedom for for-profit corporations, but not for Na-
tive Americans.  
